Anuccheda 22

The Jīva Is Not Mere Consciousness 

It was said earlier by Jāmātṛ Muni, “The ātmā is not mere consciousness” [ jñāna-mātrātmako na ca, quality no. 5]. What exactly does this mean? It means that even while being purely of the nature of consciousness, the jīva has the capacity to know (jñāna-śaktitva), just as light, which is itself luminous, also has the power to illuminate [other objects].
This was demonstrated by the following verse, quoted in the Tattva Sandarbha (Anuccheda 53):

nātmā jajāna na mariṣyati naidhate’sau
na kṣīyate savana-vid vyabhicāriṇāṁ hi
sarvatra śaśvad anapāyy upalabdhi-mātraṁ
prāṇo yathendriya-balena vikalpitaṁ sat 

Because it is the witness of the variable states [childhood, youth, and so on] of the transient material body, this ātmā is without birth, growth, decay, or death. Although the ātmā is exclusively of the nature of consciousness, present everywhere, eternal, and invariable, it appears to assume various forms under the influence of sense perception and cognition, just as the vital force (prāṇa) within the body, although one, appears as if many in contact with the various senses. (sb 11.3.38)

suddho vicaṣṭe hy avisuddha-kartuḥ
(See Anuccheda 1.)

It is perfectly clear from the above that the self has such power of knowing, because the verse says that although the atma is exclusively of the nature of consciousness (upalabdhi-matra), it is a knower, or witness, of the variable states of the transient material body (savana-vit). Therefore, it was said, “[The knower of the presentational field], being pure, merely perceives [these beginningless modifications] of the impure actor”
(sb 5.11.12).

Sri Kapiladeva expresses this in a different way: 

guṇair vicitrāḥ sṛjatīṁ svarūpāḥ prakṛtiṁ prajāḥ
vilokya mumuhe sadyaḥ sa iha jñāna-gūhayā

Upon seeing prakṛti create, through her guṇas, varieties of progeny with forms corresponding to those guṇas, he [the self ], existing in this world, became immediately bewildered by prakṛti’s power to conceal consciousness.
(sb 3.26.5) 

In this verse, by the words “upon seeing,” “bewildered,” and “by the power to conceal consciousness,” the self’s knowing capacity ( jñana) is understood as interior to its being (pratyagbhuta) and hence distinct from prakṛti and her self-generated ignorance, which [by contrast] is external to the self (paragbhutayaḥ). It can thus be deduced that the self’s knowing capacity must be a function of its own innate power (svarupa-sakti) alone.

In the Gītā also, it is said, “Living beings are bewildered because their consciousness is covered by ignorance” – ajñānenāvṛtaṁ jñānaṁ tena muhyanti jantavaḥ
(gītā 5.15). 

Commentary

Naiyāyikas accept that the jīva is eternal, but not that it is inherently endowed with the quality of consciousness. They claim that consciousness appears only when the jīva is associated with the mind. When a jīva becomes liberated, dissociating permanently from the mind, it becomes devoid of consciousness. Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, accepts consciousness as the inherent nature of the jīva, but not agency, kartṛtva. According to them, agency belongs to prakṛti. 

Advaita Vedāntīs affirm that the jīva is consciousness alone. They do not consider consciousness to be a quality that the self, as substrate, possesses.
Śrī Jīva, while still referring to Jāmātṛ Muni’s verses [in Anuccheda 19 above] and the Padma Purāṇa, says that the jīva is not mere consciousness, but also the possessor of the power to know. It has jñāna-śakti, or cognitive potency; it is savana-vit, or the knower of temporal changes.
In support of this, Śrī Jīva cites Śrīmad Bhāgavatam (11.3.38), spoken by the sage Pippalāyana to King Nimi. The word jñāna is commonly translated as knowledge, but that is not the only meaning it carries. It will be helpful especially in this context to understand its various meanings. The word jñāna is derived from the verbal root √jñā, meaning “to know,” by applying the lyuṭ suffix.⁵
[See Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī (3.3.115), lyuṭ ca, “The affix lyuṭ is added to the root when the action is denoted in the neuter gender.” And pāṇini 3.3.117, karaṇa-adhikaraṇayoś ca, “The affix lyuṭ occurs after a root when a word’s relation with the verb denotes instrumentality or location” (translations based on Vasu 1894: 525–6).
Commentators note that the last two are the instrumental and locative cases, respectively. Jīva Gosvāmī calls the same suffix tan in Hari-nāmāmṛta-vyākaraṇa (5.458).] 

One can derive three senses by applying lyuṭ:

1. Verbal activity (bhāva).

2. Instrumentality (karaṇa).

3. Substratum (dhikaraṇa).

The word jñāna, therefore, has three etymological meanings: 

1. Jñāptir jñānam— knowledge as understanding, awareness, experience, knowing, or consciousness. Jñāna in this sense is awareness only, devoid of content. It illuminates only the subject itself and does not reveal any other object.

2. Jñāyate anena iti jñānam— knowledge as that by which an object is known. Jñāna in this sense refers to the content of knowledge, which is disclosed to a knowing subject.

3. Jñānam asti asminn iti—knowledge as that in which knowing inheres. This refers to the subject that knows or cognizes an object. Jñāna in this sense implies a subject that possesses content-knowledge, or the one in whom cognitions reside. Advaitavāda accepts only the first meaning of jñāna in relation to the self. According to them, the true nature of the self is contentless awareness, which reveals the subject alone without any object. The Bhāgavatam’s view of the conscious nature of Bhagavān (specified as advaya-jñāna in sb 1.2.11) and that of the individual self corresponds to the third definition of jñāna, since cognition inheres in both as a natural or innate feature of their being. This condition also entails the existence in them of knowledge as an instrument of cognizing objects, the second definition stated above.  

On this view, knowledge as an instrument is operative in the form of mental states ( jñāna-vṛtti), whereas knowledge as the substratum, or that in which knowing inheres, refers to what Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī means by jñāna-svarūpa, the subject’s innate capacity for knowledge, i.e., its capacity or qualitative potential to apprehend. Thus, in his view the third meaning of jñāna refers to the essential nature of the self, whereas the second meaning indicates its quality (guṇa), which manifests when the self is conjoined to the body-mind complex. We are using the word guṇa (quality) loosely here.
The relation between the self and its jñāna-vṛtti is similar to that of a magnet and the movement it induces in iron shavings. This relation cannot be precisely defined in terms of any of the categories of conventional relations postulated in Nyāya, such as of contact or inherence, because mental states (jñāna-vṛtti) are external to the self, like the movements of iron fillings.

In summary, when Advaitavādīs use the word jñāna-svarūpa, they have in mind the first meaning of jñāna, whereas Jīva Gosvāmī has in mind the third meaning. From the point of view of linguistic interpretation, one might say that the fundamental difference in ideology between Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī and Advaitavāda is in the application of the affix lyuṭ as adhikaraṇa (the substratum) versus bhāva (verbal activity).
For Śrī Jīva, knowledge thus belongs to a subject, and it is “content-filled,” meaning that it has reference to an object. Knowledge in the second sense, of mental states( jñāna-vṛtti), however, is simply a fluctuation of psychic matter, or in other words, the inert functioning of mind-matter occurring in the embodied state.

In the main verse of this anuccheda (sb 3.26.5), Bhagavān Kapila uses the phrases vilokya mumuhe, “upon seeing, the jīva is bewildered,” and jñāna-gūhayā, “by that which conceals self-awareness.” These phrases indicate that the jīva must have the innate capacity to know, since it would be impossible to cover this capacity if it did not priorly exist. Matter is inert (parāg-bhūta),⁶ whereas the jīva is conscious (pratyag-bhūta)⁷ by its very nature. But in the conditioned state, even while the jīva’s intrinsic capacity to know things in general is present, it does not extend to the point of true self-knowledge or unmediated awareness of God. Such transcendental knowledge in potentia is covered by ignorance, while the jīva’s cognitive capacity is limited to the knowing of phenomena, be they external objects, or internal perceptions, or feelings. In Bhagavad Gītā (5.15), Śrī Kṛṣṇa says that the jñāna of the jīva is covered by ajñāna, and thus the jīva is bewildered. Once again, jñāna here means the jīva’s inherent cognitive potency to know things as they are.

An objection may be raised here.

How can the jīva’s inherent cognitive potency be covered? Even if it is covered, it cannot be lost to the self, otherwise there is no sense in calling it a natural or inherent power. In response, one can say that if sugar is mixed with mud, it will not taste sweet. Still, this does not mean that the sugar has lost its sweetness.
If sugar were a conscious being, it would still know itself to be sweet although mixed with mud. Another example is that if a light bulb is covered by an opaque screen, the bulb will not have lost its luminosity even if very little light can be seen. If it were a conscious being, it would know itself to be as luminous as it was when not covered. The covering of the bulb alters only the perception of external perceivers. Similarly, if the jīva is naturally endowed with jñāna, or awareness, then even if it is covered by ignorance, it cannot become ignorant of itself as a knowing or conscious being. Moreover, ignorance is like darkness whereas jñāna is like light. Since darkness has no power to cover light, how then can ignorance veil awareness? In response, it is said that this covering is possible because of the inconceivable power of māyā, or the extrinsic potency (bahiraṅga-śakti) of Bhagavān, and that this covering has no beginning.
Therefore, while commenting on the above-mentioned Gītā verse, Śrī Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa writes that ignorance (ajñāna) is anādi, beginningless, and it assumes the form of directing attention away from the Absolute, vaimukhya. The covering of consciousness means that the awareness (jñāna) of the jīva, though eternal (nitya), becomes unmanifest (anādi-tad-vaimūkhyena ajñānena jīvānāṁ nityam api jñānam āvṛtaṁ tirohitam).
In other words, in the conditioned state, the jīva lacks inherent awareness of its own svarūpa, of Bhagavān, and of their relation. This lack of awareness has no beginning, but it can come to end when the self is surrendered to Bhagavān. This beginningless lacuna of knowledge is called “the covering of knowledge by ignorance.”
The phrase, “the covering of knowledge” ( jñānam āvṛtam), should not be taken in the literal sense of concealing self-knowledge or God-knowledge that was originally present prior to the covering. Rather, because this covering is beginningless, it refers instead to the as yet unbroken continuity of the absence of such truth-knowing. One may accordingly ask, “Then why not simply admit that the jīva is devoid of self-awareness?” If, however, it were stated as such, the doubt would remain whether the jīva could acquire intrinsic self-knowing at all. If it could acquire self-knowing, then this capacity, being newly generated, would become an incidental quality. This is unacceptable, as it contradicts scriptural statements that affirm that the ātmā is conscious by nature.⁸
If, on the other hand, the jīva could not acquire self-awareness, then it would be reduced to an inert object, as is postulated by the Naiyāyikas. For this reason, the word “covering” is used, which implies that the jīva is conscious by nature.

Therefore, Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī writes in BhaktiSandarbha (Anuccheda 1):

“Although purely conscious by nature, the jīva’s knowledge of its own intrinsic nature is covered by Bhagavān’s extrinsic potency, Māyā, because she finds in the jīva the defect of obliviousness to Him, in the form of beginningless ignorance of the Absolute Reality.”

That the jīva is intrinsically endowed with the power of knowing is a crucial principle in Vaiṣṇava theology. More broadly, it is one of the major points of contention between theistic Vedāntists and non-theistic Vedāntists. Therefore, Śrī Jīva continues to stress it in the next three sections.

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⁶ parasmai bhāsamānatvaṁ prāktvam
That which is knowable to others is called parāk.
⁷ svasmai bhāsamānatvaṁ pratyaktvam
That which is self-aware is called pratyak.
⁸ sb 7.7.19, śu 6.11